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Prevention was the most important dimension of the Responsibility to Protect’s
foundational documents and subsequent advocacy efforts. However, the actual
implementation of protection on the ground has focused on reacting to crises.
This article develops a case study of war resumption in Congo in 2008 to
understand why and how this happened. International peacebuilders took
preventive action in Congo, but not as part of the protection efforts.
Peacebuilders focused on preventing renewed national and regional wars,
and they ignored the local conflicts that fuelled these broader tensions. The
reason for this lies in a dominant culture of international peacebuilding. This
culture shaped international efforts in such a way that the three essential
conditions for effective prevention – political will, early warning and the
preventive toolbox – were present for the prevention of renewed national
and regional fighting but absent for the prevention of local violence. The
resulting strategy allowed a crisis localized in the province of North Kivu to
escalate into a full-scale war. The same type of effect appears generalizable
across several recent interventions.
Much has been written on the blue helmets’ failure to protect the population
in the Democratic Republic of Congo. For the past 13 years, every time a mas-
sacre or an egregious series of rapes and killings took place close to a United
Nations (UN) peacekeeping base – such as in Kisangani in 2002, Bukavu in
2004, Kiwanja and Dungu in 2008, Luvungi in 2010 and Beni in 2014 – Con-
golese and foreign journalists, civil society activists, human rights and huma-
nitarian organizations and international politicians would blame UN soldiers
for failing to intervene. These criticisms were particularly harsh in late 2008,
when the resumption of war in eastern Congo led to a spike in massacres vir-
tually under the watch of peacekeepers tasked with protecting the population.
One of the many shortcomings with these criticisms is that they miss the
central problem with protection efforts, in Congo and elsewhere. They put
the emphasis on the failure to react, instead of regretting the failure to
prevent these atrocities.
The original proponents of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine convin-
cingly demonstrated that prevention is a far better policy option than reaction.
Prevention is less costly than reaction to crises, and it is much less intrusive
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than military intervention when the population is in immediate danger of
physical violence. Furthermore, once a crisis has erupted, it is often too late
and too difficult to protect the population adequately.1
Understanding the failure to prevent the recurrence of violence in Congo has
potentially broad implications. An Enough report noted that ‘there are myriad
examples from recent history – Liberia, Sudan, Pakistan, and others – where
theUnited States and its international partners have successfully helped to stabil-
ize a situation, but have then reduced engagement only to see crises recur’.2
In situations like Congo, where international involvement assisted the country
in transitioning from war to peace and democracy (from 2003 to 2006), why
did international actors fail to help prevent renewed large-scale violence?
Building on the argument I developed in The Trouble with the Congo,3 this
article argues that studying the dominant international peacebuilding culture
helps explain this failure of prevention. Western and African diplomats, UN
peacekeepers and the staff of non-governmental organizations involved in
conflict resolution – all of the actors that the Responsibility to Protect doctrine
tasks with preventing the resumption of large-scale violence when the state is
unwilling or unable to do so – share a set of ideologies, rules, rituals, assump-
tions, definitions, paradigms and standard operating procedures. In Congo,
this dominant culture shaped the intervention in a way that precluded preven-
tive action at the grassroots, ultimately dooming the international efforts.
To develop this claim, I first show that prevention was the most important
aspect of the original Responsibility to Protect doctrine and subsequent advocacy
efforts, but that the implementation of the new norm has overlooked this dimen-
sion, inCongo and elsewhere. I then develop a case study of the 2008war resump-
tion in Congo in order to understand the reasons behind this neglect of
prevention. I explain that preventive actions did take place in Congo, but not
as part of specific protection efforts; rather, these actions were associated with
the standard template and core work of interveners in any post-conflict environ-
ment, regardless of whether they are specifically tasked with protection. I argue
that the prevention strategy failed to avert the resumption of large-scale violence
because it was incomplete: it focused onpreventing renewednational and regional
wars, but it ignored grassroots conflicts, which generated massive human rights
violations and fuelled the broader tensions. This strategy allowed a crisis localized
in the province of North Kivu to escalate once again into a full-scale war.
To explain why prevention was focused on national and regional issues and
not on local ones, I review the three essential conditions for effective preven-
tion, as identified by the Responsibility to Protect report: political will; early
warning; and the preventive toolbox. I demonstrate that the dominant peace-
building culture shaped how international actors understood their roles and
the paths towards peace in such a way that these three conditions were
present for the prevention of renewed national and regional fighting but
absent for the prevention of local violence.
30 S. AUTESSERRE
When not otherwise indicated, all material for the Congo case study comes
from over 500 in-depth confidential interviews, more than two-and-a-half
years of field observations in Congo’s most violent provinces and Kinshasa
between 2001 and 2014 and several additional years of participant observation
research with international peacebuilders in other conflict zones.
Protection without prevention: a general trend
Prevention, the lost dimension
Prevention of crises or of crisis recurrence was the most important com-
ponent of the original Responsibility to Protect doctrine. The idea of
moving from a reactive approach to conflicts to a culture of prevention
became influential in policy circles in the 1990s, notably within the UN and
the World Bank and among frustrated diplomats.4 In 1997, the Carnegie
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict published a landmark study
that clarified the three broad aims of preventive action – avoiding the emer-
gence of war, the spread of ongoing conflicts and the resumption of violence –
and its three main principles: ‘early reaction to signs of trouble’; ‘a compre-
hensive, balanced approach to alleviate the pressures that trigger violent con-
flict’; and ‘an extended effort to resolve the underlying root causes of
violence’.5 (In line with the actual practice of prevention on the ground,
most of this article focuses on the last two aims of preventive action.)
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS), which introduced the Responsibility to Protect concept in its 2001
final report, emphasized the centrality of prevention – although it was the
question of how to protect populations caught in the midst of war that had
triggered its work.6 The first point of the report’s ‘priorities’ section stated
that ‘prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility
to protect’.7 All subsequent key policy documents pertaining to the new
Responsibility to Protect concept reaffirmed the importance of prevention,
although prevention was never given as central a role as it occupied in the
ICISS report.8 In 2005, a heads of state summit took place to discuss the
ICISS recommendations. After heated debate, the 150 heads of state present
adopted a document stating that ‘each individual State has the responsibility
to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such
crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary
means.’9 The UN Security Council later endorsed this consensus through Res-
olution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, which ‘under-
lin[ed] the importance of taking measures aimed at conflict prevention and
resolution’, and then again ‘emphasiz[ed] the importance of preventing
armed conflict and its recurrence’. To prevent conflicts, it stressed the role
of non-military measures, including ‘promoting economic growth, poverty
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eradication, sustainable development, national reconciliation, good govern-
ance, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for, and protection of, human
rights’.10 Finally, during the 2009 debates on protection at the UN General
Assembly, states ‘consistently’ emphasized that ‘prevention was the key com-
ponent of the responsibility to protect’.11
Prevention was also a key focus of advocacy efforts surrounding the
responsibility to protect.12 Activists emphasized that protection should aim
primarily at averting the eruption, spread or resumption of violence, and
that it should primarily be a non-military endeavour; military intervention
should be used only as a last resort, when all other means (whether diplo-
matic, economic or political) have failed.13 However, the advocates faced an
important hurdle: neither the ICISS commission nor the subsequent UN
debates and documents provided clear guidance on how such prevention
could actually be conducted.14 Worse, the actual implementation of the
Responsibility to Protect doctrine mostly ignored the prevention dimension,
with the possible exception of international action in Libya in 2011.15 In
Darfur for instance, non-governmental organizations, UN peacekeepers, dip-
lomats, civil society and state actors largely focused on reaction rather than
prevention.16 The same was true for the international response to electoral
violence in Kenya in 2007 and 2008 and to the September 2009 massacre in
Guinea.17
As the rest of this article demonstrates, the Congo case also illustrates this
trend, but with an important twist. After Congo (supposedly) completed its
transition to peace and democracy in December 2006, there was preventive
action to avoid a return to violence at the national and international levels,
but there was no such action to prevent the spread of remaining local conflicts
or the resumption of violence at the grassroots. In addition, the prevention
initiatives that took place were not part of protection activities; instead,
they belonged to the standard template for international response to
ongoing wars. Although the goals of war prevention and protection of popu-
lations overlap, there are important distinctions. Prevention of war addresses
conditions that may trigger national or international conflicts, but it does not
attend to local tensions that do not threaten national or international peace,
even if these local factors create serious population protection issues.
Protection in congo: a military, reactive task
The UN peacekeeping mission in Congo, or MONUC, was one of the first UN
missions to receive a civilian protection mandate, as early as February 2000.18
In the following years, MONUC eventually evolved into ‘the UN’s largest and
most robust operation for which civilian protection is a central purpose’.19
However, all UN Security Council Resolutions interpreted protection in a
very restrictive way: it was limited to ‘the areas of deployment of
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[MONUC’s] armed units’ (which, given the low capability of the mission, left
out most of the Congolese territory), and included only action ‘within
[MONUC’s] capabilities’.20 Most importantly, the Security Council’s Resol-
utions always reduced protection to a mere reaction to ‘imminent threats of
physical violence’ (my emphasis), rather than trying to prevent such threats
in the first place. Even when the UN Security Council gave MONUC its
most robust protection mandate, in Resolution 1856 (December 2008), reac-
tion to crises remained the primary focus. Resolution 1856 ‘emphasized that
protection of civilians [… ] must be given priority in decisions about the use
of available capacity and resources, over any of the other tasks described [in
the Resolution]’, but it only required MONUC to ‘ensure the protection of
civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat of phys-
ical violence’.21 The resolution itself seemed to have been spurred as a reaction
to a massacre that had just taken place in Kiwanja, a few kilometres away from
a UN peacekeeping base, and after which Congolese civilians and inter-
national leaders had blamed UN soldiers for failing to intervene. Preventing
conflicts was never explicitly mentioned in any of these resolutions, although
several sections, such as ‘to contribute to the improvement of the security con-
ditions in which humanitarian assistance is provided’, could be interpreted as
allowing for preventive activities.22
The understanding of what protection entailed was similarly restrictive on
the ground. Up to 2004, MONUC did not act on its protection mandate.
When I was conducting fieldwork in Kinshasa and in eastern Congo from
2001 to 2003, MONUC personnel never mentioned the protection idea
during formal interviews or informal conversations. MONUC officials
rather talked about their role as if they had only an observer mandate
instead of a chapter VII one.23 UN actors started mentioning protection in
mid-2003 during the Ituri crisis, when fighting between Hema and Lendu
ethnic groups in the north-east of Congo triggered concerns among inter-
national actors of an impending genocide. Discussions, however, remained
focused on the protection of civilians in two large refugee camps located on
grounds that MONUC controlled. A year later, the UN failure to prevent
large-scale killings and rapes by various armed groups in the town of
Bukavu provoked massive protests by Congolese civilians all over the
country and outrage in many foreign capitals.24 From then on, MONUC
started acting on its protection mandate.
However, this never meant focusing on prevention. Rather, UN military
and civilian peacekeepers interpreted the protection mandate as a military
task and as a duty to fulfil once crises had erupted. Holt and Berkman’s excel-
lent study of civilian protection in Congo perfectly illustrates this point.25 The
report details how MONUC’s military component struggled to carry out the
protection mandate, and it rarely discusses the civilian part of the mission. It
shows how protection in the field involved purely reactive, military measures:
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removal of threats against civilians by ‘a cordon and search operation and/or
disarmament of individuals threatening civilian population;’ the establishment
of ‘buffer zones between combatants’ and safe areas ‘with adequate military
protection;’ utilization of an ‘area domination’ strategy through frequent
patrols, overflights, and ‘mobile temporary operations bases;’ escorting huma-
nitarian and human rights actors to areas; and evacuating populations out of
danger zones.26
The word prevention only appears in the report when associated with ‘harm
to civilians under imminent threat’ – meaning, once a conflict had already
erupted into violence and escalated to a point that the population was in
danger. Tellingly, the report never mentions the idea of preventing a crisis
from erupting, as if MONUC had never considered it.
Interviews that I conducted in Congo between 2003 and 2014 similarly
showed that MONUC (then MONUSCO)27 staff’s understanding of its pro-
tection mandate mostly involved a military reaction to crises. Questions on
the protection mandate invariably oriented the conversation towards a discus-
sion of the mission’s military strategy to respond to imminent threats of vio-
lence. At that point, the interviewee would explain that the mandate
established clear priorities: UN soldiers should protect first, UN staff and
property; second, humanitarian personnel; and third and last, Congolese civi-
lians. Several people then deplored that, given the logistic and security con-
ditions in eastern Congo and the cumbersome standard operating
procedures for UN military contingents, only a few peacekeeping troops
could be deployed to protect civilians once the first two priorities had been
fulfilled. Very few interviewees mentioned the idea of prevention, or (until
2009) the role that MONUC’s non-military personnel could play in prevent-
ing conflicts. Even MONUC’s much-touted initiatives of creating ‘Joint Pro-
tection Teams’ showed such a restrictive understanding of the protection
mandate. In February 2009, MONUC started organizing the deployment of
these teams in response to the ‘renewed mandate to protect civilians’ stipu-
lated in Resolution 1856. The terms of references for the teams, as well as
the details of the standard operating procedures that they were expected to
follow show that, although UN civilians would be part of the experience,
these teams were primarily military affairs.28 And both the terms of reference
and the actual practice on the ground evidence that these teams intervened
only in a reactive fashion, once a massacre or a series of egregious human
rights violations had transpired.
In addition to this military dimension, civilian staff of various UN agencies
claimed to contribute to protection in accordance with their respective
mandate, but protection was not their main focus until 2009. Protection
became one of the mission’s central concerns in 2009–10, and civilian peace-
keepers became more involved in this issue at that time, but, just like their
military colleagues, they acted in a reactionary manner instead of working
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preventively. The child protection section, for instance, looked after individ-
uals who had been enrolled in armed groups. The human rights section inves-
tigated cases of human rights violations, notably rapes, torture and killings.
The DDR and DDRRR section tried to demobilize combatants and, when rel-
evant, to repatriate them.29 In sum, all of these civilian interveners focused on
reacting to the consequences of violence rather than preventing their
occurrence.
Preventive actions on the ground therefore remained rare, and they were
little more than side-effects of programmes unrelated to civilian protection.
For example, MONUC deployed troops in Baraka to support the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees’ repatriation programme from Tanzania to
Congo. These troops were primarily there to protect UN staff and property
but, as a MONUC staff member argued during an interview, the deployment
could also be conceived as ‘preventive protection’ of the population and non-
governmental organizations. Even the Joint Mission Analysis Cell, which was
mandated to monitor conflicts that could escalate and threaten the mission’s
main goal, failed to seize this opportunity to act as a catalyst for prevention of
renewed crises. Until late 2007, it focused not on preventing harm to civilians,
but on preventing whatever could jeopardize MONUC’s first priority, the
organization of ‘free and fair’ elections. At the time of this writing in 2015,
the unit continues to be under-resourced, and its influence within the
mission has remained limited.
Outside of the UN mission, other international actors similarly conceptu-
alized protection as a responsibility that peacekeeping military contingents
should undertake in times of crisis, and not as a task requiring preventive
action by non-military interveners. Aid workers requested UN soldiers to
‘conduct joint assessments, provid[e] military protection to humanitarian
convoys, physically tak[e] civilians out of danger, demin[e], and establish
field hospitals’.30 The ‘protection cluster’, a group of international non-
governmental organizations, UN peacekeeping staff and UN agencies involved
in issues related to protection from 2005 onward, similarly focused on military
and mostly reactive issues, such as advocating for a judicial reform to eliminate
impunity within the Congolese army and improving MONUC’s military pres-
ence in unstable areas.31 The international response to sexual violence provides
an additional illustration of the focus on reaction. Sexual violence programmes
overwhelmingly focused on responding to abuses once they had occurred – for
instance, providing medical treatment to women who had been raped – at the
expense of the prevention of sexual abuse.32
In sum, in Congo as in other places where it was implemented, the protec-
tion doctrine acquired two characteristics that were in direct contradiction
with the spirit of the Responsibility to Protect report and subsequent advocacy
efforts. First, instead of focusing on prevention, protection focused on reac-
tion to crises. Second, instead of being mostly a civilian enterprise, with
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military intervention as a last resort, it was primarily a military affair.33 These
two developments were intimately linked. Military actors are trained and
equipped for reaction to crises. They are not trained and not equipped for
the diplomatic, economic and social measures that prevention requires.
It does not mean that there were no prevention efforts at all. Preventive
action did take place, but not as part of protection activities. Rather, these
actions were part of the template for international interventions in post-
conflict environments. Most importantly, these efforts were incomplete.
They focused on assuaging national and regional tensions in order to prevent
conflict renewal at the macro level, and they overlooked the local causes of
violence, thus dooming the international efforts.
Prevention without protection: understanding war resumption
in 2008
The resumption of war in eastern Congo in late 2008 provides a perfect case to
study these dynamics. Prior to 2008, Congo had experienced 15 years of sus-
tained violence. Localized violence erupted in the Kivu provinces in 1993 and
escalated when more than a million Rwandan refugees poured into eastern
Congo after the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Eventually, the tensions caused
two successive civil and international wars, the first from 1996 to 1997 and
the second from 1998 to 2003. Militarily, these conflicts involved up to 14
foreign armed groups, three main rebel movements and countless fragmented
militias. They caused an estimated three to five million casualties and desta-
bilized most of Central and Southern Africa.34
In 2003, a settlement was reached at the national and regional levels. (In
this article, regional refers to the level of the African Great Lakes Region:
Burundi, Congo, Rwanda and Uganda). Foreign troops officially withdrew
from Congolese territory and normal diplomatic ties progressively resumed
between former enemies. From June 2003 to December 2006, Congo went
through a transition from war to peace and democracy. Its main achievements
were the official reunification of the country, the formation of a unified gov-
ernment and an attempt at integrating the different armed groups into a single
national army. General presidential, legislative and provincial elections offi-
cially marked the successful completion of the transition. In early 2007,
Congo was officially at peace.35
However, violence persisted at a very high level in the eastern provinces
both during and after the transition.36 Then, in the second half of 2008, the
conflict escalated again. From his stronghold in North Kivu, rebel leader
Laurent Nkunda launched an offensive against government troops and
announced his intention to seize power in Kinshasa. By December 2008, he
had conquered large parts of the North Kivu province and threatened the pro-
vincial capital of Goma. While instability was growing in the Kivus, the
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situation also sharply deteriorated in Oriental Province. Local militias multi-
plied, and Ugandan troops re-entered Congo in December 2008, officially to
fight the Lord’s Resistance Army, a Ugandan rebel movement partly based on
Congolese territory. A flurry of diplomatic action by international actors,
coupled with MONUC’s strongest military operation to date and a major
reshuffle of alliances between regional leaders, finally managed to remove
the immediate threat on Goma and halt the renewed war. However, the
spike in fighting had already caused hundreds of casualties and forced more
than half a million people to relocate.
This resumption of large-scale violence in North Kivu in 2008 is a textbook
case of international failure to prevent protection crises. From the official end
of the war in 2003 to the resumption of large-scale conflict in 2008, the situ-
ation of the Congolese eastern provinces indeed met the criteria for inter-
national action stipulated by the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. ‘Serious
and irreparable harm’ was ‘occurring’ or ‘imminently likely to occur’ ‘to
human beings’ as a ‘result of internal war, insurgency, repression [and]
state failure’.37 Violence was the result partly of ‘deliberate state action’,
partly of ‘state’s neglect or inability to act’ and partly of ‘a failed state situ-
ation’.38 In short, the Congolese state was unable or unwilling to fulfil its
responsibility to protect its population – or, to use the criteria agreed on at
the 2005 heads of state meeting, the Congolese state was ‘manifestly failing
at’ protecting its citizens. International support to Congolese actors trying
to prevent a resumption of war was therefore deeply needed.
This international support could have taken ‘many forms’, including
‘development assistance and other efforts to help address the root cause of
potential conflict; or efforts to provide support for local initiatives to
advance good governance, human rights, or the rule of law; or good offices
missions, mediation efforts and other efforts to promote dialogue or reconci-
liation’.39 As the rest of this section shows, international actors did carry out
such efforts, but they focused on only some of the root causes of violence – the
national and regional tensions. They neglected other critical ones – the local,
bottom–up conflicts. They therefore let significant tensions fester, to the point
that grassroots antagonisms over land and power created significant protec-
tion problems and eventually reignited broader conflicts.
Incomplete efforts to prevent the recurrence of national and regional
conflicts
For analytical clarity, we can divide the root causes of the renewed crisis in
North Kivu into two categories: first, national and regional causes, and
second, local ones.40 At the regional level, the Rwandan government regularly
deplored that rebel Rwandan Hutu militias were still present in Congo and
that they posed an important threat to Rwanda because they included some
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of those responsible for the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. According to many
sources, Rwanda was actually more interested in pursuing two other goals
in Congo. First, it wanted to continue the illegal exploitation of Congolese
mineral resources, which remained an important source of revenue for
Rwanda. Second, it needed to protect the Congolese population of
Rwandan descent living in Congo, a minority that Congolese indigenous
groups had consistently discriminated against since Congolese independence
in 1960.
At the national level, the president and most former rebel leaders main-
tained parallel command structures over their soldiers in order to retain
their territorial control and weaken their political enemies. Consequently,
the army integration process was mostly a failure, and the government
could barely extend its authority in the eastern provinces. At the time of
this writing, there is still no functioning justice system and no reliable
police force there. Soldiers regularly prey on the population, which means
stealing and usually beating, raping, torturing or killing those who refuse to
comply. Lawlessness, impunity and absence of state authority thus persist,
creating a fertile ground for continued and renewed violence.
The tensions between most Congolese leaders and the representatives of
Congolese with Rwandan ancestry were another important cause of violence
after the war officially ended. During the electoral campaigns, almost all the
national actors that did not belong to the Congolese population of
Rwandan descent used propaganda against this minority as a way to rally sup-
porters. This hate speech led to many abuses against Congolese with Rwandan
ancestry. The 2006 elections only reinforced their marginalization, as they
managed to send just a few representatives to the provincial and national
assemblies. Fearing for their lives, status and properties, Congolese of
Rwandan descent became increasingly radicalized, which fuelled Nkunda’s
rebellion and Rwandan involvement in Congo.
National economic agendas were also highly influential. Numerous
national factions remained involved in the illegal exploitation of resources
after the war officially ended. A large part of the continued fighting centred
on the control of mining sites and export routes, both before and during
the 2008 resumption of large-scale violence.
International actors did try to address these regional and national pro-
blems. Diplomats and UN officials organized numerous conferences to
provide Congolese, Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan leaders with a
forum where they could discuss their economic and security concerns. In
times of crises, African and Western states put pressure on the Rwandan
and Ugandan governments in order to prevent them from invading Congo
again. Diplomats and UN officials also strove to convince Congolese warlords
to integrate their soldiers into the army, while a few African and Western
countries trained integrated army brigades. Finally, all donors devoted
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massive resources to organizing general elections, which they saw as the best
way to end the violent struggle for power and to reconstruct a legitimate state
authority.
It is true that international actors could have done more to prevent national
and regional antagonisms from causing a renewal of large-scale violence. They
could have further prioritized supporting the Congolese army so that it devel-
oped ways to integrate all of the armed groups. They could have devoted
much more attention and resources to the reconstruction of the Congolese
justice system, which is essential to ending impunity and thus deterring vio-
lence. They could have further pressured the Congolese and Rwandan govern-
ments so that they stopped fuelling violence on the ground and addressed the
problem posed by the Rwandan Hutu militias.
However, the international actors’main failure was not related to interven-
tion at the macro levels. Incomplete as it was, it achieved significant results
between 2003 and 2008. It largely assuaged many national and regional ten-
sions, in turn leading to a decrease in manipulation of local armed groups by
national and regional actors. By early 2008, a relative peace and stability had
returned to most of Congolese territory. Many inhabitants of war-torn pro-
vinces saw their living conditions improve; displaced people started returning
home and reconstructing their villages; and items of basic necessity (such as
oil and salt) reappeared in most markets. If national and regional tensions had
been the only root causes of violence, Congo would have continued on its
paths towards stabilization, development and democracy. However, regional
and national agendas were not the only causes of violence. Grassroots tensions
also significantly mattered and, as national and international peacebuilders
failed to address them, they festered, escalated and eventually jeopardized
the macro-level settlements. The main flaws of the international prevention
efforts lie precisely in this neglect of bottom–up dynamics.
Neglect of the root causes of violence at the local level
While there were clear national and regional causes for the resumption of war
in 2008, the conflict was also motivated by distinctively local causes. (In this
article, local refers to the level of the individual, the family, the clan, the dis-
trict, the community and sometimes the ethnic group.) In other words, war
renewal in Congo was not purely or even mostly a consequence of national
and regional tensions.41
Grassroots political issues were key. There was significant competition at
the village or district level over who could be chiefs of villages, districts or ter-
ritories; who were the highest ranked individuals, families or ethnic groups;
and who could be appointed to local administrative positions. All of these
local political antagonisms led to small- and large-scale violence many
times during the war, the transition and the post-electoral period.
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These political tensions usually interacted with economically motivated
hostilities because political power guaranteed access to land and economic
resources, while access to resources ensured the availability of funds to buy
arms and troops that help secure political power. The economic competition
usually revolved around the two key sources of wealth in Congo: land and
mineral resources. The illegal exploitation of mineral resources in Congo
and its links to renewed fighting has been largely documented.42 However,
the stakes of land distribution are similarly intense: land provides the main
means of survival to rural Congolese families, and it is the primary way of
integrating in the local social structures. It is also a means of securing
natural resources. As a result, for centuries the distribution of land was at
the core of a lot of small- and large-scale fighting.
Finally, there were important social motivations to be part of a militia and
to continue to wage violence. Most importantly, the lack of social opportu-
nities in post-war Congo meant that being a militiaman or, even better,
a militia leader, was the best way for the un-educated and the disenfranchised
to claim resources and a social status that the traditional order denied them.
These grassroots causes of tensions constantly interacted with national and
regional dynamics. For example, micro-level economic, political and social
issues often motivated local alliances between Congolese soldiers or civilians
and foreign rebel groups. Similarly, the standard narrative presented the ten-
sions between ‘indigenous’ Congolese and the minority with Rwandan ances-
try as a purely national or regional issue, but again, local conflicts over access
to land and to traditional and administrative positions motivated large parts
of this ethnic violence.43
This analysis of the interaction between the local, national and regional
dynamics helps explain why grassroots tensions contributed to war resumption
in North Kivu. After the war officially ended in 2003, local Mai Mai militias con-
tinued to ally with Congolese president Kabila as well as with Rwandan Hutu
rebels and to fight Congolese of Rwandan descent because doing so was the
best way for them to consolidate their claims over land and local positions of
authority. Similarly, Congolese with Rwandan ancestry refused any kind of
settlement because they were afraid of revenge killings on their families and
kin and because they worried that they might lose the local economic and pol-
itical power that they acquired during the war. In 2008, as had happened in 1996
and 1998, the local conflict escalated slowly but surely. It caused large-scale
violence that no national and regional actors could stop. It fuelled the national
and regional sources of tensions – notably the threat that Rwandan Hutumilitias
posed to Rwanda, the tensions between indigenous Congolese and Congolese
with Rwandan ancestry and the complex patterns of illegal exploitation of
resources – and eventually jeopardized the macro-level settlements.
Throughout this escalation, there was barely any peacebuilding action to
assuage local tensions – sustained initiatives for the resolution of the local
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antagonisms took place only reactively, after extensive renewed violence had
taken place. Before the crisis erupted in large-scale fighting, diplomats and
UN officials left it up to Congolese authorities, Congolese religious leaders
and non-governmental organizations to conduct bottom–up peacebuilding
work. With only a few exceptions, Congolese authorities and religious
leaders were unable or unwilling to conduct local conflict resolution, and
some were involved in fuelling the violence outright. Congolese and inter-
national non-governmental organizations did implement local conflict-
resolution projects, but their numbers were too few, and they faced too
many challenges to make much of a difference. The following section
identifies the reasons behind this neglect to prevent bottom–up conflicts
from causing massive violations of human rights and eventually escalating
into renewed national and regional wars.
Assessing the three essential conditions for effective
prevention: the influence of the dominant peacebuilding
culture
The Responsibility to Protect report identified three essential conditions for
effective prevention: first, political will; second, ‘knowledge of the fragility
of the situation and the risks associated with it’ – called ‘early warning’;
and third, ‘understanding of the policy measures available that are capable
of making a difference’ – called the ‘preventive toolbox’.44 This section
shows that these three conditions were present only for the prevention of
national and regional conflicts but not for the prevention of local ones.
This section also identifies the reasons behind this difference: a dominant
peacebuilding culture shaped the international intervention strategy in a
way that precluded local conflict prevention.45
Political will
Take the problem most often mentioned by Congolese and international actors,
the lack of political will. Building on previous research on peacekeeping,46 one
could hypothesize that international interveners decided to ignore the prevention
dimension because of vested economic, political, security or institutional interests.
Two issuesmay have been especially important. First,major powers, whichwould
bear the bulk of the cost of any protection programme, may have been reluctant
to devote the financial, diplomatic and military resources to make programmes
successful. Second, all or most states may have prioritized upholding the sover-
eignty norm at the expense of bottom–up peacebuilding efforts.
This section shows that the dominant peacebuilding culture constructed
international interests in such a way that these two explanations applied to
local conflict resolution and not to macro-level intervention.
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Reluctance to devote resources to protection: During interviews, policy-
makers and practitioners often complained that, due to insufficient inter-
national political will to address the Congolese conflict, peacebuilders on
the ground lacked the troops, funding and equipment necessary to conduct
effective protection.47 The few countries and international organizations
working in Congo lacked sufficient national interest to get strongly involved
(this was the case of the USA, France and the UK), or they lacked the capa-
bilities to follow through on their ambitions (as happened with Belgium,
South Africa and the African Union).48 As a result, the resources devoted
to Congo were paltry compared to the needs and, according to my intervie-
wees, this precluded international action at the grassroots to prevent war
resumption.
This explanation for the lack of preventive action at the local level is pro-
blematic for two reasons. First, preventing crises usually requires fewer
resources than reacting to them. Given that prevention is not and should
not be a military activity, focusing on prevention resolves the problem of
finding better and more military troops and equipment. Furthermore,
Smith and Sullivan have shown that, in most cases, it is much more cost-effec-
tive to prevent crises than to react to them.49 The Carnegie Commission made
a similar point in its study of seven major interventions in the 1990s. It
demonstrated that international interveners could have saved $130 billion
out of $200 billion spent if they had adopted a more effective preventive
approach.50 No Congo-specific study has yet been developed, but there is
little reason to believe that this case would have been an exception.
The second and most important problem with this explanation is that it is
incorrect to argue that there was no political will to address the Congolese
crisis or to prevent war resumption. International interveners devoted signifi-
cant resources to address the perceived causes of the problem. The peacekeep-
ing mission deployed in Congo was and still is the largest and most expensive
UN mission in the world. In 2003, the European Union sent the first ever
European-led peacekeeping mission to Congo, and it stayed in the unstable
Ituri district for three months. The International Criminal Court chose Con-
golese warlords as its historic first cases. Foreign donors contributed half the
Congolese budget for most of the 2003–07 period, and they devoted over $670
million to the organization of the 2006 elections. As detailed above, diplomats
and high-ranking UN officials also actively tried to promote national and
regional reconciliation.
In certain cases, these resources enabled peacebuilders on the ground to
overcome logistical and security obstacles. A comparison between the organ-
ization of elections (in 2006 and 2011) and local conflict resolution efforts is
particularly illuminating in this regard.51 Regional and national leaders,
including spoilers, could (and at times did) derail the electoral processes in
the same way that they could (and sometimes did) disrupt bottom–up
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peacebuilding projects. The collapse of the state bureaucracy in many eastern
provinces hampered any kind of project needing state support, be it election
organization or local conflict resolution. The unceasing security problems
affected the electoral process – by preventing freedom of campaigning, endan-
gering candidates and limiting access to unstable areas – to the same extent
that they affected local peacebuilding initiatives – by imperilling local peace-
builders and similarly restricting access to unstable locales. The lack of roads
and communication infrastructures limited travel in a way that was as proble-
matic for election organization as for local peacebuilding. International inter-
veners had to surmount the overwhelming complexity of the politico-military
situation both in the case of elections (to ensure the ‘fairness’ of the electoral
process) and in the case of local peacebuilding (to find solutions acceptable to
all parties). The polarization of Congolese society meant that the population
saw electoral agents with about the same level of suspicion as they regarded
local peacebuilders.
However, international interveners devoted massive logistical, financial
and human resources to the organization of elections in 2006 and 2011.
These resources helped make logistical and security obstacles manageable,
so that international and Congolese actors could successfully organize presi-
dential, legislative and provincial elections. There was, however, no such
prioritization for bottom–up peacebuilding, which prevented peacebuilders
from overcoming logistical and security obstacles to their increased involve-
ment at the local level.
In sum, the material constraints resulting from the lack of political will
were not absolute obstacles to the prevention of war resumption. They did
not affect action at the macro level in the same measure that they affected
action at the micro level. We therefore have to understand why international
actors perceived contextual and material constraints as obstacles to preventive
action at the grassroots but not to preventive action at the macro levels.
The answer to this question is that the dominant peacebuilding culture con-
structed national and regional reconciliation as a first priority and relegated local
conflict resolution as a negligible task. As I have argued elsewhere, diplomats and
UN staff members are trained to work on super-structures, such as national and
international negotiations, and they are socialized to focus on predefined tasks
and performance guidelines that fail to consider local violence.52 They therefore
believed that their only legitimate role was to intervene at the macro levels.
Influenced by the ideological environment of the post-cold war era, they
especially viewed the organization of elections as a favourite state and peace-
buildingmechanism.They sawother state- andpeacebuilding tasks as secondary
priorities, and if they approached them, they did so in a top–down fashion. The
dominant culture thus enabled foreign actors to pursue an intervention strategy
that overlooked the need for local conflict resolution, despite the presence of
significant political will to prevent war resumption.
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Sovereignty and double standards: The same approach is useful to analyse
the significance of the sovereignty norm.
Many policymakers and practitioners hold state sovereignty as the central
obstacle to a full implementation of the responsibility to protect doctrine.53
Likewise, in Congo, during interviews, international interveners often men-
tioned the sovereignty of the Congolese state as the main obstacle to their
trying to prevent bottom–up violence. Diplomats and UN staffers argued
that local conflicts were an internal matter and therefore, as in any sovereign
country, national authorities were the most legitimate actors to address these
internal issues. As a result, according to peacekeeping officials I interviewed, it
was, ‘not necessary, even legitimate’ to deal with questions other than the
national peace process.
However, as the Responsibility to Protect report emphasized, prevention is
usually much less intrusive – and therefore much more respectful of state
sovereignty – than direct military intervention in reaction to a crisis.54 Fur-
thermore, UN and diplomatic interveners have not always considered the
Congolese sovereignty as an absolute constraint. Instead, they have disre-
garded the sovereignty norm whenever they deemed it necessary. For
instance, they closely supervised the writing of the new constitution in 2005
and 2006, the organization of elections in 2006 (and, to a lesser extent, in
2011) and various legislative processes, which were all principally matters
of national sovereignty.55
International actors did not interpret state sovereignty as inhibiting their
involvement in electoral, legislative and constitutional matters for one
central reason. The dominant discourse on sovereignty has significantly
evolved in the twentieth century, and humanitarian goals have progressively
become legitimate reasons for ignoring state sovereignty, especially in
Africa.56 In the case of Congo, this evolving discursive construction enabled
international actors to legitimize overlooking Congolese sovereignty in
order to address what they saw as the cause of the humanitarian and security
problems in the region – the lack of elected (and thus legitimate) leadership in
the 2000s.57 By contrast, because international actors did not acknowledge the
critical role of local conflicts in causing humanitarian problems or in threaten-
ing international peace and security, they viewed sovereignty as an insur-
mountable obstacle to their involvement in this ‘domestic issue’.58 This
analysis leads us to the second condition for effective prevention, the ‘knowl-
edge of the fragility of the situation and the risks associated with it.
Early warning
As was evident in my interviews, between the official end of the war in 2003
and war resumption in 2008, international actors were perfectly aware of the
fragility of the national and regional settlements and the likelihood of war
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resumption at the macro levels. By contrast, as I have demonstrated elsewhere,
their knowledge of how fragile the local situation was, and of the risks that
escalating local conflicts posed to general peace, was limited if not non-exist-
ent.59 This was true both for organizations whose responsibilities include early
warning on issues that impact protection of populations (such as the UN
Department of Political Affairs) and for early warning bodies not directly
related to the responsibility to protect (such as the specialized units within
the US or British governments). Some staff members based in the field, as
well as a handful of researchers based in headquarters or capitals, had a
much deeper knowledge of local situations and a much more accurate sense
of how risky it was to ignore local conflicts, but their hierarchies often
ignored their reports warning of impending crises. Similarly, researchers
and advocates trying to raise awareness of the risks of war resumption
should local conflicts continue to fester – such as the Congolese think tank
Pole Institute and the Swedish non-governmental organization Life and
Peace Institute – were heard only once the crisis had already escalated.60
Once again, we can explain this situation by analysing the dominant peace-
building culture. UN staff and diplomats are trained to analyse conflicts from
a top–down perspective.61 As a result, they identify national and regional ten-
sions as the causes of the continued fighting and massacres in the eastern
Congolese provinces. In addition, between 2003 and 2008, UN staff and dip-
lomats defined the Congolese context as a ‘post-conflict’ environment; the
various bouts of large-scale fighting thus became mere ‘crises’ rather than evi-
dence that the war was about to resume. To explain away the violence that
they could not relate to any national or regional antagonisms, international
peacebuilders used several interrelated frameworks of analysis. In their
view, local violence was private and criminal, and it was the consequence of
the lack of state authority in Congo. More importantly, because the image
of the Congolese ‘inherent savagery’ had persisted since the Belgian colonizers
constructed it a century ago, foreign actors usually saw extensive local vio-
lence as a normal feature of life in a peaceful Congo.
The North Kivu crisis illustrates how this understanding of violence pre-
cluded international preventive action at the grassroots. From 2003 to 2008,
because Congo was officially labelled a ‘post-conflict’ country (and, in 2007,
a country at peace), sub-national actors such as the ‘renegade leader’
Laurent Nkunda could no longer be conceptualized as rebels or warring
parties. As a result, international mediation between different combatants
was not an option any more because at least one of the parties was considered
illegitimate.
In the first months of 2004, for instance, when warning signs of an impend-
ing crisis were developing, the MONUC leadership categorized Nkunda as an
illegal actor whom it forbade its staff members from meeting.62 At that time,
the Congolese actors participating in the transition were the only legitimate
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partners for diplomats and UN staff. The logic of exclusion continued until it
was too late: Nkunda took over the eastern city of Bukavu (South Kivu) in
May 2004, and MONUC officials were forced to negotiate with him. Then
again, in 2006 to 2007, when it became obvious that Nkunda was building
a quasi-independent state in the territory under his control in North Kivu,
the top UN hierarchy similarly prevented its staff from meeting with the agi-
tator. The setbacks of this strategy became evident in late 2007 and in 2008,
when heavy fighting resumed between Nkunda and the Congolese army.
Intervention took place only when a renewal of extensive violence demon-
strated the fragility of the local situation and the risks that local conflicts posed
to the broader settlements. From August 2008 onward, as the spectre of a
renewed national and regional war loomed larger, MONUC redeployed 90
per cent of its troops to the Kivus. In late November, the UN Security
Council authorized the temporary deployment of additional troops to
reinforce the peacekeeping missions’ capacity, and in December, it authorized
an extra 3,000 peacekeeping troops and strengthened their protection
mandate. By that time, however, it was too late. The time for prevention
had passed, the Congolese populations were once more ‘in immediate
danger of physical violence’, and international interveners were merely react-
ing to a major crisis.
The preventive toolbox
The ‘understanding of the policy measures available that are capable of
making a difference’ was similarly present in the case of national and inter-
national action, but not in the case of support to grassroots movements.63
Foreign ministries, international and regional organizations and even non-
governmental organizations have developed an extensive expertise and
numerous standard operating procedures to facilitate national and regional
dialogues and to organize elections. However, none of the international
bureaucracies involved in peacebuilding, such as the UN and the diplomatic
missions, have developed any organizational capacity to address local con-
flicts. None have specialized units for grassroots peacebuilding, ready-made
analytical frameworks to understand decentralized conflicts, standard operat-
ing procedures to address bottom–up problems or predefined indicators to
measure the successful completion of the task. And UN staff and diplomats
have no training for work at the local level. During my interviews, whenever
I asked a diplomat or a UN peacekeeper if he had received training on local
conflict resolution, he always replied in the negative.
More broadly, peacebuilding bureaucracies have no standard operating
procedures for preventive protection of populations, apart from a few early
warning systems.64 During interviews, field-based peacekeepers regularly
complained that the units mandated to protect civilians were not used to
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implementing that kind of mandate and therefore they had to invent every-
thing as they went. Eventually, one of the routines that developed was to
think of protection as a military and reactive task, as detailed above.
This does not mean that local conflict prevention was impossible. To the
contrary, it would have been perfectly possible to implement prevention pro-
grammes with existing resources, so that local problems did not again jeopar-
dize the national and regional peace (although such a change would have
required a significant reconceptualization in the way peacebuilders think
and operate).65 Rather than focusing all their efforts on organizing elections
right after the war ended, which negatively affected the prospects for peace
without helping promote democracy, international peacebuilders could
have used part of the resources to finance local conflict-resolution efforts.
This would have provided much needed funding to Congolese non-
governmental organizations. They could have implemented local reconcilia-
tion projects, such as building a market, a school or a health centre shared
by two communities in conflict in order to re-establish social and commercial
links between them. They could also have helped reconstruct social mechan-
isms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, such as local justice institutions.
In each peacekeeping site, MONUC could have deployed, alongside the
military, a civilian staff member tasked with monitoring local tensions and
providing suggestions for resolution. He or she could have been allowed to
draw on military, diplomatic or development resources to promote local
peace.
Conclusion
In many cases, the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine
has overlooked its central tenet: preventing crises should take precedence
over responding to them. This flawed reconceptualization of the doctrine is
all the more puzzling because the obstacles usually mentioned to explain pro-
tection failure – the sovereignty norm and the presence of financial, logistic
and human resources constraints – are more problematic for reactive than
preventive action.
This article has demonstrated that, in Congo, the failure to prevent the
resumption of large-scale violence was due to the international neglect of
bottom–up tensions. Preventive action at the grassroots was overlooked,
not because of the often-mentioned constraints posed by the sovereignty
norm and the lack of financial and human resources, but because a dominant
peacebuilding culture shaped the international understanding of the causes of
violence and the paths towards peace in a way that precluded support to
bottom–up conflict resolution.
This suggests new avenues for research on the Responsibility to Protect.
Local conflicts are often critically important in sustaining violence in most
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unstable environments.66 Furthermore, as I have argued elsewhere, the domi-
nant international peacebuilding culture regularly precludes international
action at the local level, thus hampering effective preventive action.67 As a
result, millions of people regularly face imminent threats of physical violence,
which heighten the need for reactive, military, and intrusive protection inter-
ventions. Only a focus on lowering the barriers to international support of
preventive grassroots action has a chance to end this vicious circle.
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